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Abstract
This paper investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes
in public goods economies with any number of firms and commodities. We show that the
Lindahl mechanism is informationally efficient in the sense that it uses the smallest mes-
sage space among smooth resource allocation processes that are informationally decentral-
ized and realize Pareto optimal allocations over the class of public goods economies where
Lindahl equilibria exist. Furthermore, we show that the Lindahl mechanism is the unique
informationally efficient decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient and individu-
ally rational allocations in public goods economies with Cobb-Douglas utility functions and
quadratic production functions.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D5, D61, D71, D83, P51.
1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Hurwicz (1960) and Mount and Reiter (1974), there has been a lot
of work on studying the informational requirements of decentralized resource allocation mecha-
nisms. The focus in this literature has particularly been on the dimension of the message space
being used for communication among agents. These informational requirements depend upon
two basic components: the class and types of economic environments over which a mechanism
is supposed to operate and the particular outcomes that a mechanism is required to realize.
This paper will study the informational requirements of resource allocation mechanisms that
select Pareto optimal allocations for public goods economies with general convex production
technologies and any number of producers and goods.
∗Financial support from the Texas Advanced Research Program as well as from the Private Enterprise Research
Center, and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas A&M University is gratefully acknowledged.
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The interest in studying the informational requirements and the design of resource allocation
mechanisms was greatly stimulated by the “socialist controversy” — the debate over the feasi-
bility of central planning between Mises-Hayek and Lange-Lerner. In line with the prevailing
tradition, interest in this area was focused on Pareto-optimality and informationally decentral-
ized decision making. Allocative efficiency (Pareto optimality) and informational efficiency are
two highly desired properties for an economic mechanism to have. Pareto optimality requires
resources be allocated efficiently while informational efficiency requires an economic system have
the minimal informational cost of operation.
The notion of an allocation mechanism was first formalized by Hurwicz (1960). Such a mech-
anism can be viewed as an abstract planning procedure; it consists of a message space in which
communication takes place, rules by which the agents form messages, and an outcome function
that translates messages into outcomes (allocations of resources). Mechanisms are imagined to
operate iteratively. Attention, however, may be focused on mechanisms that have stationary or
equilibrium messages for each possible economic environment. A mechanism realizes a prespec-
ified welfare criterion (called social choice rule, or social choice correspondence) if the outcomes
given by the outcome function agree with the welfare criterion at the stationary messages. The
realization theory studies the question of how much communication must be provided to realize
a given performance, or more precisely, studies the minimal informational cost of operating a
given performance in terms of the size of the message space and determines which economic
system or social choice rule is informationally the most efficient in the sense that a minimal
informational cost is used to operate the system. Such studies can be found in Hurwicz (1972,
1977), Mount and Reiter (1974), Calsamiglia (1977), Walker (1977), Sato (1981), Hurwicz, Re-
iter, and Saari (1985), Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993), Tian (1990, 1994, 2004, 2006) among
others.
One of the well-known results in this literature establishes the minimality of the competitive
mechanism in using information for pure exchange economies. Hurwicz (1972), Mount and Re-
iter (1974), Walker (1977), Hurwicz (1986b) among others proved that, for pure exchange private
goods economies, the Walrasian allocation process is the informationally efficient process in the
sense that any smooth informationlly decentralized allocation mechanism that achieves Pareto
optimal allocations must use information as least as large as the competitive mechanism, i.e.,
the competitive allocation process has a message space of minimal dimension among smooth
resource allocation processes that are privacy preserving (informationally decentralized) and
non-wasteful (i.e., yielding Pareto efficient allocations).1 For brevity, these results have been re-
ferred to as the Efficiency Theorem. Jordan (1982) and Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993) further
provided the Uniqueness Theorem for private goods pure exchange economies. Jordan (1982)
1The term “smoothness” used here is not referred as the usual differentiability of a function. Instead, the
smoothness of a mechanism referees that the stationary message correspondence is either locally threaded or if
the inverse of the stationary message correspondence has a Lipschizian-continuous selection in the subset. This
terminology was used by Hurwicz (1999). We will give the definition of the local threadedness below.
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proved that the competitive allocation process is uniquely informationally efficient. Calsamiglia
and Kirman (1993) proved the equal income Walrasian mechanism is uniquely informationally
efficient among all allocations mechanisms that realize fair allocations. Recently, Tian (2004)
investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in pure exchange
economies with consumption externalities. It is shown that the distributive Lindahl mechanism
is a uniquely informationally efficient allocation process that is informationally decentralized
and realizes Pareto efficient allocations over the class of economies that include non-malevolent
economies. Tian (2006) further proved the unique informational efficiency of the competitive
market mechanism for private ownership production economies. These efficiency and unique-
ness results are of fundamental importance from the point of view of political economy. They
show the uniqueness of the competitive market mechanism in terms of allocative efficiency and
informational efficiency for private goods economies.
The concept of Lindahl equilibrium in economies with public goods is, in many ways, a
natural generalization of the Walrasian equilibrium notion in private goods economies, with
attention to the well-known duality that reverses the role of prices and quantities between
private and public goods, and between Walrasian and Lindahl allocations. In the Walrasian case,
prices must be equalized while quantities are individualized; in the Lindahl case the quantities
of the public good must be the same for everyone, while prices charged for public goods are
individualized. In addition, the concepts of Walrasian and Lindahl equilibria are both relevant
to private-ownership economies. Furthermore, they are characterized by purely price-taking
behavior on the part of agents. It is essentially this property that one can also exploit to define
the Lindahl process as an informationally decentralized process.
For the class of public goods economies, Sato (1981) obtained a similar result showing that
the Lindahl allocation process has a message space of minimal dimension among a certain class
of resource allocation processes that are privacy preserving and non-wasteful. However, Sato
(1981) only dealt with the class of public goods economies with just a single producer, and in
such a case, a special class of economies is constructed using a class of linear production sets for
the producer. Quite clearly, more complex production sets must be devised when the number of
firms increases. So one of the purpose of the paper is to fill this gap, although our main purpose
in the paper is to establish the unique informational efficiency of the Lindahl mechanism.
In this paper we establish the informational optimality and uniqueness of the Lindahl mech-
anism for public goods economies with any number of producers. The task of this paper is
three-fold. First, we establish the lower bound of information, as measured by the Fre´chet topo-
logical size of the message space, that is required to guarantee an informationally decentralized
mechanism to realize Pareto efficient allocations over the class of public goods economies. The-
orem 1 shows that any smooth informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto
efficient allocations on a class of public goods economies that includes a test family of Cobb-
Douglas utility functions and quadratic production functions as a subclass has a message space
of dimension no smaller than (L+K − 1)I + (L+K)J , where I is the number of consumers, J
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is the number of firms, L is the number of private goods, and K is the number of public goods.
Second, we establish the informational optimality of the Lindahl mechanism. Theorem 2
shows that the lower bound is exactly the size of the message space of the Lindahl mechanism,
and thus any smooth informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient
allocations over the class of public goods economies in which Lindahl equilibria exist has a
message space of dimension no smaller than the one for the Lindahl allocation mechanism, and
thus the Lindahl mechanism is informationally the most efficient process among smooth privacy
preserving and non-wasteful resource allocation mechanisms.
Third, we show that the Lindahl mechanism is actually the unique informationally efficient
process that realizes Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations over the class of pub-
lic goods economies with Cobb-Douglas utility functions and quadratic production functions.
Theorem 3 shows that any informationally decentralized, individually rational, and non-wasteful
mechanism with the (L+K−1)I+(L+L)J-dimensional message space and a continuous single-
valued stationary message function is essentially the Lindahl mechanism on the test family with
Cobb-Douglas utility functions and quadratic production functions. Thus, any other economic
institution that achieves Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations for public goods
economies must use a message space whose informational size is bigger than that of the Lindahl
mechanism.
In an unpublished paper, Nayak (1982) attempted to establish the informational efficiency
of the Lindahl mechanism for public goods economies. However, he considered an unusual class
of production technology sets that results in positive outputs with zero inputs. Nevertheless,
to the author’s knowledge, there is no “Uniqueness Theorem” on the Lindahl mechanism for
public goods economies in the literature. It may also be worthwhile to mention that the proof
of Lemma 6 relies on the local homology of manifolds. However, no knowledge of algebraic
topology is required to understand the statements of the other lemmas and theorems.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a formal description
of the model. We specify public goods economic environments with any number of goods and
firms, and give notation and definitions on resource allocation, performance correspondence,
outcome function, allocation mechanism, etc. Section 3 establishes a lower bound of the size
of the message space that is required to guarantee that a smooth informationally decentralized
mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient allocations on the class of public goods economies.
Section 4 gives an Efficiency Theorem on the allocative efficiency and informational efficiency
of the Lindahl mechanism for the class of public goods economies where Lindahl equilibria
exist. Section 5 gives a Uniqueness Theorem that shows that only the Lindahl mechanism is
informationally efficient over the class of public goods economies with Cobb-Douglas utility
functions and quadratic production functions. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
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2 Model
In this section we will give notation, definitions, and a framework that will be used in the paper.
2.1 Public Goods Economic Environments
Consider public goods economies with L private goods, K public goods, I consumers (charac-
terized by their consumption sets, preferences, and endowments), and J firms (characterized by
their production sets). It will often be convenient to distinguish a vector representing a private
commodity bundle with an index ρ, a vector of public goods with an index σ. Throughout this
paper, subscripts are used to index consumers or firms, and superscripts are used to index goods
unless otherwise stated. By an agent, we will mean either a consumer or a producer, thus there
are N := I + J = 2 agents.2
For the ith consumer, his characteristic is denoted by ei = (Xi, wi, Ri), where Xi ⊂ RL+K
is his consumption set, wi ∈ RL is his initial endowments of the private goods, and Ri is a
preference ordering on Xi which is assumed to be strictly monotonically increasing, convex3,
and continuous. Let Pi be the strict preference (asymmetric part) of Ri. We assume that
there are no initial endowments of public goods, and the public goods will be produced from
private goods. For producer j, his characteristic is denoted by ej = (Yj) where Yj ⊂ RL+K is
his production possibility set. We assume that, for j = I + 1, . . . , N , Yj is nonempty, closed,
convex, and 0 ∈ Yj . Denote by Ei the set of the i-th agent’s characteristics.
An economy is the full vector e = (e1, . . . , eI , eI+1, . . . , eN ) and the set of all such production
economies is denoted by E that is endowed with the product topology.
2.2 Allocations
Let xi = (x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) denote a consumption bundle of commodities by consumer i, where x
ρ
i is the
net exchange of private goods and xσi is a consumption vector of the public goods by consumer
i. Denote by x = (x1, . . . , xI) a (net) consumption distribution. A consumption distribution
x is said to be individually feasible if (xρi + wi, x
σ
i ) ∈ Xi for all i = 1, . . . , I. Similarly, let
yj = (y
ρ
j , y
σ
j ) denote producer j’s (net) output vector that has positive components for outputs
and negative ones for inputs. Here yρj is a production vector of the private goods and y
σ
j is a
production vector of the public goods by producer j. Note that, by the assumption of no public
goods inputs, yσj = 0. Denote by y = (yI+1, . . . , yN ) a production plan. A production plan y is
said to be individually feasible if yj ∈ Yj for all j = I + 1, . . . , I + J .
An allocation of the economy e is a vector z := (x, y) ∈ RN(L+K) with (xρi +wi, xσi ) ∈ Xi for
i = 1, . . . , I and yj ∈ Yj for j = I = 1, . . . , I+J . An allocation z = (x, y) is said to be consistent
2As usual, vector inequalities are defined as follows: Let a, b ∈ Rm. Then a = b means as = bs for all
s = 1, . . . ,m; a ≥ b means a = b but a 6= b; a > b means as > bs for all s = 1, . . . ,m.
3Ri is convex if for bundles a, b, c with 0 < λ 5 1 and c = λa + (1 − λ)b, the relation a Pi b implies c Pi b.
Note that the term “convex” is defined as in Debreu (1959), not as in some recent textbooks.
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if
I∑
i=1
xρi =
N∑
j=I+1
yρj , (1)
and
xσi =
N∑
j=I+1
yσj , i = 1, . . . , I, (2)
i.e., the total net demand for the private goods by consumers is equal to the total net supply of
private goods by producers, and the consumption of the public goods by each consumer is equal
to the total production of public goods by producers, and thus all consumers consume the same
amounts of public goods.
An allocation z = (x, y) is said to be feasible if it is consistent and individually feasible for
all individuals.
An allocation z = (x, y) is said to be Pareto efficient if it is feasible and there does not exist
another feasible allocation z′ = (x′, y′) such that (xρ′i +wi, x
σ′
i )Ri(x
ρ
i +wi, x
σ
i ) for all i = 1, . . . , I
and (xρ′i + wi, x
σ′
i )Pi(x
ρ
i + wi, x
σ
i ) for some i = 1, . . . , I. Denote by P (e) the set of all such
allocations.
An important characterization of a Pareto optimal allocation is associated with the following
concept.
A price system (p, q) = (p, q1, . . . , qI) ∈ RL+IK+ is called a vector of efficiency prices for a
Pareto optimal allocation (x, y) if
(a) p·xρi+qi ·xσ 5 p·xρ′i +qi ·xσ′ for all i = 1, . . . , I and all x′i such that (x′ρi +wi, x′σi ) ∈
Xi fo and (x
ρ′
i + wi, x
σ′
i )Ri(x
ρ
i + wi, x
σ
i );
(b) p · yρj + qˆ · yσj = p · yρ′j + qˆ · yσ′j for all y′j ∈ Yj , j = I +1, . . . , N . Here qˆ =
∑I
i=1 qi.
Similar to Debreu (1959, p. 93), we may call (x, y) an equilibrium relative to the price
system p. It is well known that under certain regularity conditions such as convexity, continuity,
etc, as we assumed in the paper, every Pareto optimal allocation (x, y) has an efficiency price
associated with it (see Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972)). Note that by the strict monotonicity
of preferences, we must have (p, q) ∈ RL+IK++
It is perhaps not obvious what the appropriate generalization of the individual rationality
concept should be for public goods economies in the presence of decreasing returns to scale.
It is natural to seek a distribution (called the reference distribution) that would play a role
analogous to that played by the initial endowment in the case of constant returns. The reference
distribution then should depend on the environment as well as how much was produced, by
whom, and other factors. Thus, similar to Hurwicz (1979), we introduce the following definition
of individual rationality of an allocation for public goods economies, which includes the usual
individual rationality for public goods economies with constant returns as a special case.
An allocation z = (x, y) is said to be individually rational with respect to the fixed share
guarantee structure γi(e; θ) if (x
ρ
i + wi, x
σ
i )Ri(γi(e; θ) + wi, 0) for all i = 1, . . . , I. Here, γi(e; θ)
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is given by
γi(e; θ) =
∑N
j=I+1 θij [p · yρj + qˆ · yσj ]
p · wi wi, i = 1, . . . , I, (3)
where (p; q) is an efficiency price system for e and the θij are non-negative fractions such that∑n
i=1 θij = 1 for j = I + 1, . . . , N . Denote by Iθ(e) the set of all such allocations.
Now we define the Lindahl equilibria of a private ownership economy with public goods in
which the i-th consumer owns the share θij of the j-th producer, and is, consequently entitled
to the corresponding fraction of its profits. Thus, the ownership structure can be denoted by
the matrix θ = (θij). Denote by Θ the set of all such ownership structures.
An allocation z = (x, y) = (x1, x2, . . . , xI , yI+1, yI+2, ..., yN ) ∈ RI(L+K)++ × Y is a θ-Lindahl
allocation for an economy e if it is feasible and there is a price system (p, q) = (p, q1, . . . , qI) with
the price vector p ∈ RL++ and personalized price vectors qi ∈ RK++, one for each i, such that:
(1) p · xρi + qi · xσ =
∑N
j=I+1 θij [p · yρj + qˆ · yσj ] for all i = 1, . . . , I;
(2) (xρ′i +wi, x
σ′) Pi (x
ρ
i +wi, x
σ
i ) implies p · xρ′i + qi · xσ′ >
∑N
j=I+1 θij [p · yρj + qˆ · yσj ]
for all i = 1, . . . , I;
(3) p · yρj + qˆ · yσj = p · yρ′j + qˆ · yσ′j for all y′j ∈ Yj and j = I + 1, . . . , N .
Here qˆ =
∑I
i=1 qi. Denote by Lθ(e) the set of all such allocations, and by Lθ(e) the set of all
such price-allocation triple (p, q, z).
It may be remarked that, every θ-Lindahl allocation is clearly individually rational with
respect to γi(e; θ), and also, by the strict monotonicity of preferences, it is Pareto efficient.
Thus we have Lθ(e) ⊂ Iθ(e) ∩ P (e) for all e ∈ E.
2.3 Allocation Mechanisms
Let Z = {(x, y) ∈ R(L+K)(I+J) : ∑Ii=1 xρi = ∑Nj=I+1 yρj & xσi = ∑Nj=I+1 yσj (i = 1, . . . , I)}
and let F be a social choice rule, i.e., a correspondence from E to Z. Following Mount and
Reiter (1974), a message process is a pair 〈M,µ〉, where M is a set of abstract messages and
called message space, and µ : E →→ M is a stationary or equilibrium message correspondence
that assigns to every economy e the set of stationary (equilibrium) messages. An allocation
mechanism (process) is a triple 〈M,µ, h〉 defined on E, where h : M → Z is the outcome
function that assigns every equilibrium message m ∈ µ(e) to the corresponding trade z ∈ Z.
An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉, defined on E, realizes the social choice rule F , if for all
e ∈ E, µ(e) 6= ∅ and h(m) ∈ F (e) for all m ∈ µ(e).
In this paper, informational properties will be investigated for a class of mechanisms that
realize Pareto efficient outcomes. Let P(e) be a set of Pareto efficient allocations for e ∈ E.
An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is said to be non-wasteful on E with respect to P if for all
e ∈ E, µ(e) 6= ∅ and h(m) ∈ P(e) for all m ∈ µ(e). If an allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is
non-wasteful on E with respect to P , the set of all Pareto efficient outcomes, then it is said
simply to be non-wasteful on E.
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An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is said to be privacy-preserving or informationally de-
centralized on E if there exists a correspondence µi : Ei →→ M for each i such that µ(e) =⋂n
i=1 µi(ei) for all e ∈ E.
Thus, when a mechanism is privacy-preserving, each individual’s messages are dependent on
the environments only through the characteristics of the individual and the individual does not
need to know the characteristics of the other individuals.
Remark 1 This important feature of the communication process implies that the so called
“crossing condition” has to be satisfied. Mount and Reiter (Lemma 5, 1974) showed that an
allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is privacy-preserving on E if and only if for every i and every e
and e′ in E, µ(e)∩µ(e′) = µ(e′i, e−i)∩µ(ei, e′−i), where (e′i, e−i) = (e1, . . . , ei−1, e′i, ei+1, . . . , eN ),
i.e., the ith element of e is replaced by e′i. Thus, if two economies have the same equilibrium
message, then any “crossed economy” in which one agent from one of the two initial economies
is “switched” with the agent from the other must have the same equilibrium message. Hence,
for a given mechanism, if two economies have the same equilibrium message m, the mechanism
leads to the same outcome for both, and further, this outcome must also be the outcome of the
mechanism for any of the crossed economies because of the crossing condition.
Let 〈M,µ, h〉 be an allocation mechanism on E. The stationary message correspondence µ
is said to be locally threaded at e ∈ E if it has a locally continuous single-valued selection at e.
That is, there is a neighborhood N(e) ⊂ E and a continuous function f : N(e)→M such that
f(e′) ∈ µ(e′) for all e′ ∈ N(e). The stationary message correspondence µ is said to be locally
threaded on E if it is locally threaded at every e ∈ E.
2.4 The Lindahl Process
We now give a privacy-preserving process that realizes the Lindahl correspondence Lθ, and in
which messages consist of prices and trades of all agents. To do so, we restrict ourselves to
the subset, denoted by EL, of production economies on which L(e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ EL. For
convenience, in this section, we normalize the price system by making the first private goods
the numeraire so that p1 = 1.
Define the demand correspondence of consumer i (i = 1, . . . , I) Di : RL++×RIK++×Θ×RJ+×Ei
by
Di(p, q, θ, piI+1, . . . , piN , ei) = (4)
{xi : (xρi + wi, xσi ) ∈ Xi, p · xρi + qi · xσi =
N∑
j=I+1
θijpij
(xρ′i + wi, x
σ′
i ) Pi (x
ρ
i + wi, x
σ
i ) implies p · xρ′i + qi · xσ′i >
N∑
j=I+1
θijpij , } (5)
where pij is the profit of firm j (j = I + 1, . . . , N).
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Define the supply correspondence of producer j (j = I + 1, . . . , N) Sj : RL++ ×RIK++ ×Ej by
Sj(p, q, ej) = {yj : yj ∈ Yj , p · yρj + qˆ · yσj = p · yρ′j + qˆ · yσ′j ∀y′j ∈ Yj}. (6)
Note that (p, q, x, y) is a θ-Lindahl equilibrium for economy e with the private ownership
structure θ if p ∈ RL++, q ∈ RIK++, xi ∈ Di(p, q, θ, p · yρI+1 + qˆ · yσI+1, . . . , p · yρN + qˆ · yσN , ) for
i = 1, . . . , I, yj ∈ Sj(p, q, ej) for j = I + 1, . . . , N , and the allocation (x, y) is consistent.
The Lindahl process 〈ML, µL, hL〉 is defined as follows.
Define ML = RL++ × RIK++ × Z.
Define µL : E →→ML by
µL(e) =
N⋂
i=1
µLi(ei), (7)
where µLi : Ei →→ML is defined as follows:
(1) For i = 1, . . . , I, µLi(ei) = {(p, q, x, y) : p ∈ RL++, q ∈ RIK++, xi ∈ Di(p, q, θ, p ·
yρI+1+qˆ·yσI+1, . . . , p·yρN+qˆ·yσN , ei),
∑I
i=1 x
ρ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
ρ
j , and x
σ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
σ
j , i =
1, . . . , I}.
(2) For i = I + 1, . . . , N , µLi(ei) = {(p, q, x, y) : p ∈ RL++, q ∈ RIK++, yi ∈ Si(p, q, ei),∑I
i=1 x
ρ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
ρ
j , and x
σ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
σ
j , i = 1, . . . , I}.
Thus, we have µL(e) = Lθ(e) for all e ∈ E.
Finally, the Lindahl outcome function hL :ML → Z is defined by
hL(p, q, x, y) = (x, y), (8)
which is an element in Lθ(e).
The Lindahl process can be viewed as a formalization of resource allocation, which is non-
wasteful and individually rational with respect to the fixed share guarantee structure γi(e; θ).
The Lindahl message process is privacy-preserving by the construction of the Lindahl process.
Remark 2 For a given private ownership structure matrix θ, since an element,m = (p, q, x1, . . . , xI ,
yI+1, . . . , yN ) ∈ RL++×RIK++×RN(L+K), of the Lindahl message spaceML satisfies the conditions
p1 = 1,
∑I
i=1 x
ρ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
ρ
j , x
σ
i =
∑N
j=I+1 y
σ
j , p · xρi + qi · xσi =
∑N
j=I+1 θij [p · yρj + qˆ · yσj ] for
i = 1, . . . , I, and one of these equations is not independent, any Lindahl message is contained
within a Euclidean space of dimension (L+IK+IL+IK+JL+JK)−(1+L++IK+I)+1 =
(L + K − 1)I + (L + K)J and thus, an upper bound on the Euclidean dimension of ML is
(L+K − 1)I + (L+K)J .
2.5 Informational Size of Message Spaces
The notion of informational size can be considered as a concept that characterizes the relative
sizes of topological spaces that are used to convey information in the resource allocation process.
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It would be natural to consider that a space, say S, has more information than the other space
T whenever S is topologically “larger” than T . This suggests the following definition, which was
introduced by Walker (1977).
Let S and T be two topological spaces. The space S is said to have as much information as the
space T by the Fre´chet ordering, denoted by S =F T , if T can be embedded homeomorphically
in S, i.e., if there is a subspace of S′ of S which is homeomorphic to T .
Let S and T be two topological spaces and let ψ : T → S be a correspondence. The
correspondence ψ is said to be injective if ψ(t) ∩ ψ(t′) 6= ∅ implies t = t′ for any t, t′ ∈ T . That
is, the inverse, (ψ)−1, of ψ is a single-valued function.
A topological space M is an n-dimensional manifold if it is locally homeomorphic to Rn.
2.6 Cobb-Douglas-Quadratic Economies
To establish the informational efficiency of the Lindahl mechanism, we will adopt a standard
approach that is widely used in the realization literature: For a set of admissible economies and
a smooth informationally decentralized mechanism realizing a social choice correspondence, if
one can find a (parametrized) subset (test family) of the set such that the subset is of dimension
n, and the stationary message correspondence is injective, that is, if the inverse of the stationary
message correspondence is single-valued, then the dimension of the message space required for
an informationally decentralized mechanism to realize the social choice correspondence cannot
be lower than n on the subset. Thus, it cannot be lower than n for any superset of the subset,
and in particular, for the entire class of economies. It is this result that was used by Hurwicz
(1977), Mount and Reiter (1974), Walker (1977), Sato (1981), Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993)
among others to show the minimal dimension and thus informational efficiency of the competitive
mechanism, Lindahl mechanism, and the equal-income Walrasian mechanism over the various
classes of economic environments. It is also this result that was used by Calsamiglia (1977)
and Hurwicz (1999) to show the non-existence of a smooth finite-dimensional message space
mechanism that realize Pareto efficient allocations in certain economies with increasing returns
and economies with production externalities that result in non-convex production sets. It is
the same result that will be used in the present paper to establish the lower bound of the size
of the message space required for an informationally decentralized and non-wasteful smooth
mechanism on the test family that we will specify below, and consequently over the entire class
of public goods economies with general convex preferences and production sets.
The test family, denoted by Ecq =
∏N
i=1E
cq
i , are a special class of public goods economies,
where preference orderings are characterized by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and efficient
production technology are characterized by quadratic functions.
For i = 1, . . . , I, consumer i’s admissible economic characteristics in Ecqi are given by the
set of all ei = (Xi, wi, Ri) such that Xi = RL+K+ , wi > 0, and Ri is represented by a Cobb-
Douglas utility function u(·, ai, ci) with ai ∈ RL−1++ and ci ∈ RK++ such that u(xρi +wi, xσi , ai, ci) =
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(xρ1i + w
1
i )[
∏L
l=2(x
ρl
i + w
l
i)
ali ][
∏K
k=1(x
σk
i )
cki ].
For i = I +1, . . . , N , producer i’s admissible economic characteristics are given by the set of
all ei = Y(bi, di) such that
Y(bi, di) = {yi ∈ RL : b1i y1i +
L∑
l=2
[yρli +
bli
2
(yρli )
2] +
K∑
k=1
[yσki +
dki
2
(yσki )
2] 5 0
0 5 yρli 5
1
bli
for l = 2, . . . , L
0 5 yσki 5
1
dki
for k = 1, . . . ,K}, (9)
where bi = (b1i , . . . , b
L
i ) with b
l
i > 1 for l = 1, . . . , L, and di = (d
1
i , . . . , d
K
i ) with d
d
i > 1
for k = 1, . . . ,K. It is clear that any economy in Ecq is fully specified by the parameters
a = (a2, . . . , aI), b = (bI+1, . . . , bN ), c = (c1, . . . , cI), and d = (dI+1, . . . , dN ). Furthermore,
production sets are nonempty, closed, and convex by noting that 0 ∈ Y(bi, di) and their efficient
points are represented by quadratic production functions in which yρ1i is an input, and all other
components of yi are outputs.
Given an initial endowment w¯ ∈ RLI++, with w¯1i = 2(L+K − 1)J , define a subset E¯cq of Ecq
by E¯cq = {e ∈ Ecd : wi = w¯i ∀i = 1, . . . , I}. That is, endowments are constant over E¯cq.
A topology is introduced to the class E¯cq as follows. Let ‖·‖ be the usual Euclidean norm on
RL+K . For each consumer i, (i = 1, . . . , I), define a metric δ on E¯cqi by δ[ui(·, ai, ci), u(·, a¯i, c¯i)] =
‖ai − a¯i‖ + ‖ci − c¯i‖. Note that, since endowments are fixed over E¯cqi , this defines a topol-
ogy on E¯cqi . Similarly, for each producer i, (i = I + 1, . . . , N), define a metric δ on E¯
cq
i by
δ[Y(bi, di),Y(b¯i, d¯i)] = ‖bi− b¯i‖+‖di− d¯i‖. We may endow E¯cq with the product topology of the
E¯cqi (i = 1, . . . , N) and we call this the parameter topology, which will be denoted by Tp. Then
it is clear that the topological space (E¯cq, Tp) is homeomorphic to the (L+K − 1)I + (L+K)J
dimensional Euclidean space R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J .
3 The Lower Bound of Informational Requirements of Mecha-
nisms
In this section we establish a lower bound (the minimal amount) of information, as measured
by the Fre´chet information size of the message space, that is required to guarantee that an
informationally decentralized mechanism realizes Pareto efficient allocations on, E, the class of
public goods economies.
As usual, to establish the efficiency results, we need to impose the interiority assumption that
Pareto efficient allocations are interioir. A sufficient condition that guarantees interior outcomes
is that a mechanism is individually rational. In fact, a mechanism that gives everything to a
single individual yields Pareto efficient outcomes and no information about prices is needed.
Thus, given a class E of economies that includes Ecq, we define an optimality correspondence
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P : E →→ Z such that the restriction P|Ecq associates with e ∈ Ecq the set of P(e) of all the
Pareto efficient allocations that assign strictly positive consumption to every consumer.
The following lemma, which is based on the test family of Cob-Douglas–Quadratic economies
E¯cq specified in the above section, is central in finding the lower bound of informational require-
ments of resource allocation processes by the Fre´chet ordering.
Lemma 1 Suppose 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation mechanism on the special class of economies E¯cq
such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P.
Then, the stationary message correspondence µ is injective on E¯cq. That is, its inverse is a
single-valued mapping on µ(E¯cq).
Proof. Suppose that there is a message m ∈ µ(e)∩µ(e¯) for e, e¯ ∈ E¯cq. It will be proved that
e = e¯. Since µ is a privacy-preserving correspondence,
µ(e) ∩ µ(e¯) = µ(e¯i, e−i) ∩ µ(ei, e¯−i) (10)
for all i = 1, . . . , N by Remark 1, and hence, in particular,
m ∈ µ(e) ∩ µ(e¯i, e−i) (11)
for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let z = (x, y) = h(m). Since the process 〈M,µ, h〉 is non-wasteful with
respect to P, z = h(m) and (11 ) imply that z ∈ P(e) ∩ P(e¯i, e−i). Since Cobb-Douglas utility
functions ui(x) are strictly quasi-concave and production functions defined by efficient points of
production sets, −yρ1j = 1b1j
∑L
l=2(y
ρl
j +
blj
2 (y
ρl
j )
2) + 1
b1j
∑K
k=1(y
σl
j +
dkj
2 (y
σk
j )
2), are strictly convex,
by the usual Lagrangian method of constrained maximization, z ∈ P(e) implies
ali(x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
(xρli + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + bljy
ρl
j
b1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (12)
I∑
i=1
cki (x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
xσki
=
1 + dkj y
σk
j
b1j
k = 1, . . . ,K, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (13)
and
b1jy
1
j = −
L∑
l=2
[yρlj +
blj
2
(yρlj )
2]−
K∑
k=1
[yσkj +
dkj
2
(yσkj )
2] j = I + 1, . . . , N. (14)
(12) and (13) are well-known conditions for Pareto efficiency for economies with public goods.
At Pareto optimality, (12) means the marginal rate of substitution between two privates goods
for each consumer i should be equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution between the
two goods for all producers j, and (13) means the sum of marginal rate of substitutions between
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a public good and a privates good for all consumers should be equal to the marginal rate of
technical substitution between these two goods for all producers j.
Similarly, z ∈ P(e¯i, e−i) implies
a¯li(x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
(xρli + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + bljy
ρl
j
b1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (15)
c¯ki (x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
xσki
+
I∑
s 6=i
cks(x
ρ1
s + w¯1s)
xσks
=
1 + dkj y
σk
j
b1j
k = 1, . . . ,K, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (16)
From equations (12) and (15), we have
ali = a¯
l
i l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, (17)
and from equations (13) and (16), we have
cki (x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
xσki
=
c¯ki (x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
xσki
(18)
and thus we have
cki = c¯
k
i k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , I, (19)
i.e., a = a¯ and c = c¯.
As for producers, z ∈ P(e¯j , e−j) implies
ali(x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
(xρli + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + b¯ljy
ρl
j
b¯1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (20)
I∑
i=1
cki (x
ρ1
i + w¯
1
i )
xσki
=
1 + d¯kj y
σk
j
b¯1j
k = 1, . . . ,K, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (21)
and
b¯1jy
1
j = −
L∑
l=2
[yρlj +
b¯lj
2
(yρlj )
2]−
K∑
k=1
[yσkj +
d¯kj
2
(yσkj )
2] j = I + 1, . . . , N. (22)
From equations (12) and (20), we derive
b1j
b¯1j
=
1 + bljy
ρl
j
1 + b¯ljy
ρl
j
l = 2, . . . , L, ; j = I + 1, . . . , N. (23)
Also, from equations (13) and (21), we derive
b1j
b¯1j
=
1 + dkj y
σk
j
1 + d¯ljy
σk
j
k = 1, . . . ,K, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (24)
From equations (14) and (22), we derive
b1j
b¯1j
=
∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
dkj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
d¯kj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
j = I + 1, . . . , N. (25)
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Thus, from equations (23) and (25), we have
1 + bljy
ρl
j∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
dkj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
=
1 + b¯ljy
ρl
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
d¯kj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
(26)
for l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N , and from equations (24) and (25), we have
1 + dkj y
σk
j∑L
l=2(1 +
bkj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
dkj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
=
1 + d¯kj y
σk
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
d¯kj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
(27)
for l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N.
Multiplying yρlj on the both sides of equation (26) and y
σk
j on the both sides of equation
(27), and then making summations oven these two equations, we have∑L
l=2(1 + b
l
jy
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 + d
k
j y
σk
j )y
σk
j∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
dkj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
=
∑L
l=2(1 + b¯
l
jy
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 + d¯
k
j y
σk
j )y
σk
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
ρl
j )y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1(1 +
d¯kj
2 y
σk
j )y
σk
j
(28)
for j = I + 1, . . . , N. Simplifying equation (28), we have
L∑
l=2
blj(y
ρl
j )
2 +
K∑
k=1
dkj (y
σk
j )
2 =
L∑
l=2
b¯lj(y
ρl
j )
2 +
K∑
k=1
d¯kj (y
σk
j )
2 j = I + 1, . . . , N. (29)
Multiplying 1/2 and adding
∑L
l=2 y
ρl
j +
∑K
k=1 y
σk
j on the both sides of equation (29), and then
applying equations (14) and (22), we have
b1jy
ρ1
j = b¯
1
jy
ρ1
j j = I + 1, . . . , N, (30)
which implies
b1j = b¯
1
j j = I + 1, . . . , N. (31)
Finally, from equations (23), (24) and (31), we have
blj = b¯
l
j l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (32)
and
dkj = d¯
k
j k = 1, . . . ,K, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (33)
Thus, we have proved
bj = b¯j j = I + 1, . . . , N, (34)
and
dj = d¯j j = I + 1, . . . , N, (35)
which means b = b¯ and d = d¯. Thus, equations (17), (19), (34), and (35) mean that e = e¯.
Consequently, the inverse of the stationary message correspondence, (µ)−1 is a single-valued
mapping from µ(E¯cq) to E¯cq. Q.E.D.
The following theorem establishes a lower bound of the Fre´chet ordering informational size
of messages spaces of any smooth allocation mechanism that is informationally decentralized
and non-wasteful over the class of economies E.
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Theorem 1 (Informational Boundedness Theorem) Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an alloca-
tion mechanism on the class of public goods economies E such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) M is a Hausdorff topological space;
(iv) µ is locally threaded at some point e ∈ E¯cq.
Then, the size of the message space M is at least as large as R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J , that is, M =F
R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J .
Proof. As was noted above, E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Hence, it suffices
to show M =F E¯cq.
By the injectiveness of Lemma 1, we know that the restriction µ|E¯cq of the stationary message
correspondence µ to E¯cq is an injective correspondence. Since µ is locally threaded at e ∈ E¯cq,
there exists a neighborhood N(e) of e and a continuous function f : N(e) → M such that
f(e′) ∈ µ(e′) for all e′ ∈ N(e). Then f is a continuous injection from N(e) intoM . Since µ is an
injective correspondence from E¯cq into M , thus f is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e).
Since E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J , there exists a compact set N¯(e) ⊂ N(e)
with nonempty interior point. Also, since f is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e), f is a
continuous one-to-one function from the compact space N¯(e) onto a Hausdorff topological space
f(N¯(e)). Hence, it follows that the restriction f |N¯(e) is a homeomorphic imbedding on N¯(e)
by Theorem 5.8 in Kelley (1955, p. 141). Choose an open ball N˚(e) ⊂ N¯(e). Then N˚(e) and
f(N˚(e)) are homeomorphic by a homeomorphism f |N˚(e) : N˚(e) → f(N˚(e)). This, together
with the fact that E¯cq is homeomorphic to its open ball N˚(e), implies that E¯cq is homeomorphic
to f(N˚(e)) ⊂ M , implying that µL(EL) =F E¯cd can be homeomorphically imbedded in µ(EL).
Hence, it follows that M =F E¯cd =F R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Q.E.D.
4 Informational Efficiency of Lindahl Mechanism
In the previous section, we found that the lower bound of the Fre´chet informational size of
message spaces for smooth allocation mechanisms that are privacy-preserving and non-wasteful
over the class E of public goods economies that includes E¯cq is the (L + K − 1)I + (L +
K)J-dimensional Euclidean space R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . In this section we assert that the lower
bound is exactly the size of the message space of the Lindahl mechanism, and thus the Lindahl
mechanism is informationally efficient among all smooth resource allocation mechanisms that
are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over the set EL of production economies on
which L(e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ EL.
From Remark 2, we know that the upper bound dimension of the message space of the
Lindahl mechanism is also (L + K − 1)I + (L + K)J . As a result, if we can show that this
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upper bound can be reached on the restriction of the message space of the Lindahl mechanism
to the test family E¯cq of Cobb-Douglas–Quadratic economies, i.e., if we can show that µL|E¯cq is
homeomorphic to the (L+K−1)I+(L+K)J-dimensional Euclidean space R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J ,
then we know that the Fre´chet informational size of the message space of the Lindahl mechanism
is R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J and thus the Lindahl mechanism is informationally efficient among all
resource allocation mechanisms that are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over
the class of economies in which Lindahl equilibria exist. Hence, to show the informational
efficiency of the Lindahl mechanism, it suffices for us to show that this upper bound can be
actually reached on the test family of economies for the Lindahl mechanism.
We will first state the following lemmas that shows that the Lindahl mechanism is single-
valued and continuous so that it is locally threaded on the test family set E¯cq of Cobb-Douglas–
Quadratic economies.
Lemma 2 For any given private ownership structure matrix θ, every economy in E¯cq has a
unique θ-Lindahl equilibrium, i.e., Lθ(e) is a single-valued mapping from E¯cq to Z.
Proof. To show the existence and uniqueness of θ-Lindahl equilibrium, we want to first derive
the supply and demand functions of agents.
Produce i (i = I + 1, . . . , N) chooses his production plan so as to maximize profit within
Y(bi, di). Thus, he solves the following profit maximizing problem:
max[p · yρi + qˆ · yσi ]
subject to
b1i y
ρ1
i +
L∑
l=2
[yρli +
bli
2
(yρli )
2] +
K∑
k=1
[yσki +
dki
2
(yσki )
2] = 0, (36)
0 5 yρli 5
1
bli
for all l = 2, . . . , L,
and
0 5 yσki 5
1
dki
for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
An interior solution y must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
p1 = λib1i (37)
pl = λi(1 + bliy
l
i), l = 2, . . . , L, (38)
where λi is a Lagrange multiplier. From (37) and (38), and the restrictions 0 5 yρli 5 1bli for
l = 2, . . . , L and 0 5 yσki 5 1dki for k = 1, . . . ,K, we can obtain the supply functions
yρli (p, q) =

1
bli
if p
l
p1
= 2
b1i
b1i p
l
blip
1 − 1bli if
1
b1i
< p
l
p1
< 2
b1i
0 if p
l
p1
5 1
b1i
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for l = 2, . . . , L,
yσki (p, q) =

1
dki
if q
k
i
p1
= 2
b1i
b1i q
k
i
dki p
1 − 1dki if
1
b1i
<
qki
p1
< 2
b1i
0 if q
k
i
p1
5 1
b1i
for k = 1, . . . ,K and i = 1, . . . , I, and thus, by (36),
yρ1i (p, q) = −
1
b1i
L∑
l=2
[yρli (p, q) +
bli
2
(yρli (p, q))
2]− 1
b1i
K∑
k=1
[yσki (p, q) +
dki
2
(yσki (p, q))
2]. (39)
It may be remarked that −3(L+K − 1)/2 5 y1i (p, q) 5 0 for all (p, q) ∈ RL+K++ . Indeed, for
l = 2, . . . , L, if 1
b1i
< p
l
p1
< 2
b1i
, then yρli (p, q) =
b1i p
l
blip
1 − 1bli <
1
bli
which means b
1
i p
l
p1
< 2, and thus
yρli (p, q) +
bli
2
(yρli (p, q))
2 =
[
1 +
bli
2
yρli (p, q)
]
yρli (p, q)
=
[
1 +
bli
2
(
b1i p
l
blip
1
− 1
bli
)][
b1i p
l
blip
1
− 1
bli
]
=
1
2bli
(
1 +
b1i p
l
p1
)(
b1i p
l
p1
− 1
)
=
1
2bli
[(
b1i p
l
p1
)2
− 1
]
< 3/2 (40)
by noting that bli > 1 and
b1i p
l
p1
< 2. If p
l
p1
= 2
b1i
, then yρli (p, q) =
1
bli
and thus yρli (p, q) +
bli
2 (y
ρl
i (p, q))
2 = 1
bli
+ 1
2bli
< 3/2. If p
l
p1
5 1
b1i
, then yρli (p, q) = 0 by (39). Thus, for each l =
2, . . . , L, 0 5 yρli (p, q) +
bli
2 (y
ρl
i (p, q))
2 < 3/2 for all (p, q) ∈ RL+K++ . Similarly, we can show
0 5 yσki (p, q) < 3/2 for k = 1, . . . ,K and for all (p, q) ∈ RL+K++ . Therefore by (39), we have
−3(L+K − 1)/2 < yρ1i (p, q) 5 0 for all (p, q) ∈ RL+K++ .
Consumer i (for i = 1, . . . , I) chooses his consumption so as to maximize his utility subject
to his budget constraint. Since all utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, the net demand functions
for private goods are given by
xρ1i (p, q) =
1
p1(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
p · w¯i + N∑
j=I+1
θij [p · yρj (p, q) + qˆ · yσj (p, q)]
−w¯1i , (41)
and
xρli (p, q) =
ali
pli(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
p · w¯i + N∑
j=I+1
θij [p · yρj (p, q) + qˆ · yσj (p, q)]
− w¯li (42)
for l = 2, . . . , L. The demand functions for public goods are given by
xσki (p, q) =
cki
qki (1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
p · w¯i + N∑
j=I+1
θij [p · yρj (p, q) + qˆ · yσj (p, q)]
 . (43)
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Define the aggregate net excess demand function for private goods by
zˆρ(p, q) =
I∑
i=1
xρi (p, q)−
N∑
i=I+1
yρi (p, q). (44)
Define the i-the consumer’s excess demand function for public goods by
zˆσi (p, q) = x
σ
i (p, q)−
N∑
i=I+1
yσi (p, q) (45)
for i = 1, . . . , I.
To show the existence and uniqueness of Lindahl equilibrium, we define a transformed econ-
omy e′ with only private commodities such that there is one-to-one correspondence between the
transformed private goods economy e′ and the original public goods economy e. This approach
is standard and has been adopted by Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972) to show the existence
of Lindahl equilibrium. Extend the commodity space by considering each consumer’s bundle
of public goods as a separate group of commodities. In this KI + L space, extend the sets Xi
by writing zeros for all public good components not corresponding to the i-th consumer. The
transformed production sets are defined by Y ′(bj , dj) = {(yρj , yσj1), . . . , (yρj , yσjI) : yσj1 = . . . =
yσjI = y
σ
j & (y
ρ
j , y
σ
j ) ∈ Y(bj , dj)} for j = I + 1, . . . , I + J .
Notice that, since every consumer’s budget constraint holds with equality, and the demand
and supply functions are clearly continuous, the aggregate excess demand function zˆ(p, q) =
(zˆρ, zˆσ1 , . . . , zˆ
σ
I ) is continuous and satisfies Walras’s Law, i.e., p · zˆρ(p, q) + q · zˆσ(p, q) = 0 for
all p ∈ RL++. Thus, by the existence theorem on Walrasian equilibrium (cf. Varian (1992)),
there exists some (p, q) ∈ RL++ such that zˆ(p, q) 5 0, which means (p, q, zˆ(p, q)) is a θ-Walrasian
equilibrium for the transformed economy e′ and hence (p, q, zˆ(p, q)) is a θ-Lindahl equilibrium
for the original public goods economy e ∈ E¯cq.4
Now we show that every economy e ∈ E¯cq has a unique θ-Lindahl equilibrium, or, it is
equivalent to show that the corresponding transformed economy e′ has a unique θ-Walrasian
equilibrium. For this, it suffices to show that all goods for the economy e′ are gross substitutes
at any price (p, q) ∈ RL+IK++ , i.e., an increase in price, s, brings about an increase in the excess
demand for good t. When zˆ is differentiable, the gross substitutes condition becomes ∂zˆ
t(p,q)
∂ps > 0
for t 6= s.
4Another way to show the existence of a θ-Lindahl equilibrium is to apply the existence theorem of Milleron
(1972) directly by noting that Yi is closed and convex, 0 ∈ Yi, (−RL+) ∈ Yi and Yi ∩ (−Yi) ⊂ {0}.
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For each j = I + 1, . . . , N , from (39), if 1
b1i
< p
l
p1
< 2
b1i
, we have
∂yρlj (p, q)
∂pl
=
b1j
bljp
1
> 0 l = 2, . . . , L, (46)
∂yρlj (p, q)
∂ps
= 0 s 6= l, l 6= 1, (47)
∂yρlj (p, q)
∂p1
= − b
1
jp
l
blj(p1)2
< 0 l = 2, . . . , L, (48)
∂yρlj (p, q)
∂qki
= 0 i = 1, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ,K, l = 2, . . . , L. (49)
From (39), if 1
b1i
<
qli
p1
< 2
b1i
, we have
∂yσkj (p, q)
∂qki
=
b1j
dkj p
1
> 0 i = 1, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ,K, (50)
∂yσkj (p, q)
∂qti
= 0 t 6= k, k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , I, (51)
∂yσkj (p, q)
∂p1
= − b
1
jq
k
i
dkj (p1)2
< 0 k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , I, (52)
∂yσkj (p, q)
∂ps
= 0 s = 1, . . . , L, k = 1, . . . ,K. (53)
As a result, from (39), (48), and (52), we have
∂yρ1j (p, q)
∂p1
= − 1
b1j
L∑
l=2
[1 + bljy
ρl
j ]
∂yρlj
∂p1
− 1
b1j
K∑
k=1
[1 + dkj y
σk
j ]
∂yσkj
∂p1
> 0, (54)
∂yρ1j (p, q)
∂pl
= − 1
b1j
[1 + bljy
ρl
j ]
∂yρlj
∂pl
< 0, l = 2, . . . , L, (55)
∂yρ1j (p, q)
∂qki
= − 1
b1j
[1 + dkj y
σk
j ]
∂yσkj
∂qki
< 0 k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , I. (56)
When p
l
p1
5 1
b1j
(resp. q
k
i
p1
5 1
b1j
) or p
l
p1
= 2
b1j
(resp. q
k
i
p1
= 2
b1j
), yρlj (p, q) (resp. y
σk
j (p, q)) are
constant functions for l = 2, . . . , L (resp. for k = 1, . . . ,K and i = 1, . . . , I). Thus, yρlj (p, q)
is a nonincreasing function in ps and qti for any l 6= s, t = 1, . . . ,K, and any (p, q) ∈ RL+IK++ ,
and yσkj (p, q) is a nonincreasing function in q
t
i and p
l for any k 6= t, l = 1, . . . , L, and any
(p, q) ∈ RL+IK++ .
Note that, by Hotelling’s Lemma (cf. Varian (1992, p. 43),
∂[p·yρj (p,q)+qˆ·yσj (p,q)]
∂ps = y
ρs
j (p, q),
and
∂[p·yρj (p,q)+qˆ·yσj (p,q)]
∂qti
= yσtj (p, q). Also, note that y
ρl
j = 0 for l = 2, . . . , L, yσkj = 0 for
k = 1, . . . ,K, and −3(L +K − 1)/2 < yρ1j 5 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , I,
from (41), we have
∂xρli (p, q)
∂ps
=
ali
pli(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
w¯si + N∑
j=I+1
θijy
ρs
j (p, q)
 > 0 (57)
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for l 6= s, s 6= 1 by noting that yρsj (p, q) = 0 for all s = 2, . . . , L,
∂xρli (p, q)
∂qti
=
ali
pli(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
w¯si + N∑
j=I+1
θijy
σt
j (p, q)
 > 0 (58)
for t = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , I by noting that yσkj (p, q) = 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and
∂xρli (p, q)
∂p1
=
a1i
pl(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
w¯1i + N∑
j=I+1
θijy
ρ1
j (p, q)

>
ali
pl(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
w¯1i + N∑
j=I+1
θij (−3(L+K − 1)/2)

>
ali
pl(1 +
∑L
l=2 a
l
i +
∑L
k=1 c
k
i )
[2(L+K − 1)J − 3(L+K − 1)J/2] > 0 (59)
for l 6= 1. Similarly, we can show that ∂xσki (p,q)∂qtv > 0 for all v = 1, . . . , I, t 6= k, and k = 1, . . . ,K,
and ∂x
σk
i (p,q)
∂ps > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , L and k = 1, . . . ,K. Thus, the net demand function x
s
i (p, q)
is an increasing function and the supply function ysi (p, q) is nonincreasing function in price t 6= s
and for every (p, q) ∈ RL+IK++ . Therefore, an increase in price, t, brings about an increase in
the excess demand for good s, and thus all goods are gross substitutes. Hence, the θ-Walrasian
equilibrium must be unique for the transformed economy e′ (cf. Varian (1992)), and consequently
θ-Lindahl equilibrium is unique for the original economy e. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Let µcq be the Lindahl equilibrium message correspondence on E¯cq. The µcq is a
continuous function.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we know µcq = (p, x, y) is a (single-valued) function. Also, from (39),
(39), (39), (41), (42), and (43), we know that the demand function x(p, q; ξ) and supply function
y(p, q; ξ) are continuous in (p, q) and ξ := (a, b, c, d). So we only need to show the price system
(p, q) is a continuous function on E¯cq. Since the demand function x(p, q; ξ) and supply function
y(p, q; ξ) are homogenous of degree zero in (p, q), we can normalize the price system as an element
in the compact simplex set ∆¯L+IK−1 = {(p, q) ∈ RL+IK+ :
∑L
l=1 p
i +
∑I
i=1
∑K
k=1 q
k
i = 1}.
Let {e(k)} be a sequence in E¯cq and e(k) → e ∈ E¯cq. Since any economy in E¯cq is fully
specified by the parameter vector ξ, e(k)→ e implies ξ(k)→ ξ.
Let µcq = (p, q, x(p, q; ξ), y(p, q; ξ)) and µcq(k) = (p(k), q(k), x(p(k), q(k); ξ(k)), y(p(k), q(k); ξ(k))).
20
Then we have, zˆ(p, q; ξ) = 0 and zˆ(p(k); ξ(k)) = 0, e.i.,
I∑
i=1
xρi (p, q; ξ) =
N∑
j=I+1
yρj (p, q; ξ), (60)
xσi (p, q; ξ) =
N∑
j=I+1
yσj (p, q; ξ) i = 1, . . . , I, (61)
I∑
i=1
xρi (p(k); ξ(k)) =
N∑
j=I+1
yρj (p(k); ξ(k)), (62)
xσi (p(k); ξ(k)) =
N∑
j=I+1
yσj (p(k); ξ(k)) i = 1, . . . , I. (63)
Since the sequence {p(k)} is contained in the compact set ∆¯L+IK−1, there exists a convergent
subsequence {p(kt), q(kt)} which converges to, say, (p¯, q¯) ∈ ∆¯L+IK−1 and zˆ(p(kt), q(kt); ξ(kt)) =
0. Since xi(p(k), q(k); ξ(k)) and yj(p(k), q(k); ξ(k)) are continuous in ξ, zˆ(p, q; ξ) is continuous
in ξ and thus we have zˆ(p(kt), q(kt); ξ(kt)) → zˆ(p¯, q¯, ξ) as kt → ∞ and ξ(kt) → ξ. However,
since every e ∈ E¯cq has the unique θ-Lindahl equilibrium price system (p, q) which is completely
determined by zˆ(p, q; ξ) = 0, so we must have p¯ = p and q¯ = q. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Let µL be the Lindahl equilibrium message correspondence on EL, where EL ⊂ E so
that L(e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ EL. Then µL(EL) is homeomorphic to E¯cq.
Proof. Let µcq be the restriction of µL to E¯cq. By Lemmas 2 and 3, we know that µcq is a
continuous function. We want to show that the inverse of µcq, (µcq)−1 is also a function.
Let m ∈ µcq(E¯cq) and let e, e′ ∈ (µcq)−1(m). Then m ∈ µcq(e) ∩ µcq(e′) = µc(e) ∩ µc(e′) =
µc(e′i, e−i) ∩ µc(ei, e′−i) for all i = 1, . . . , N by Remark 1. Let z = hcd ∈ L(E¯cq) be the Lindahl
outcome function. Since ui is monotonically increasing, we know z is Pareto efficient by the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics. Then, the allocation process 〈ML, µcq, hcq〉 is privacy-preserving
and non-wasteful over E¯cq with respect to P. Then, by Lemma 1, e = e′ and thus (µcq)−1 is a
function. Therefore, µcq is a continuous one-to-one function on E¯cq.
Since every e is fully characterized by (a, b, c, d) ∈ R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J++ , E¯cq is homeomorphic
to the finite-dimensional Euclidean space R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Thus, it must be homeomorphic
to any open ball centered on any of its points, and also locally compact. It follows that for
any e ∈ E¯cq, we can find a neighborhood N(e) of e and a compact set N¯(e) ⊂ N(e) with
a nonempty interior point. Since µcd is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e), µcd is a
continuous one-to-one function from the compact space N¯(e) onto an Euclidean (and hence
Hausdorff topological) space µcd(N¯(e)). Hence, it follows that the restriction µcd restricted to
N(e) is a homeomorphic imbedding on N¯(e) by Theorem 5.8 in Kelley (1955, p. 141). Choose
an open ball N˚(e) ⊂ N¯(e). Then N˚(e) and µcd(N˚(e)) are homeomorphic by a homeomorphism
µcd|N˚(e) : N˚(e) → µcd(N˚(e)). This, together with the fact that E¯cq is homeomorphic to its
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open ball N˚(e), implies that E¯cq is homeomorphic to µcd(N˚(e)) ⊂ ML, implying that µcd(EL)
can be homeomorphically imbedded in µL(EL).
Finally, by Remark 2, the Lindahl message spaceML is contained within an Euclidean space
of dimension (L + K − 1)I + (L + K)J . This necessarily implies that ML and thus µL(E¯cq)
is homeomorphic to R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J because this restriction µcq(E¯cq) is homeomorphic to
R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J , and consequently, µL(EL) is homeomorphic to E¯cq. Q.E.D.
From the above lemmas and Theorem 1, we have the following theorem that establish the
informational efficiency of the Lindahl mechanism within the class of all smooth resource al-
location mechanisms that are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over the class of
production economies EL on which L(e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ EL.
Theorem 2 (Informational Efficiency Theorem) Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation
mechanism on the class EL of public goods economies EL such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) M is a Hausdorff topological space;
(iv) µ is locally threaded at some point e ∈ E¯cq.
Then, the size of the message space M is at least as large as that of the Lindahl mechanism,
that is, M =F ML =F R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J .
Proof. Let 〈ML, µL, hL〉 be the Lindahl mechanism and let E¯cq be the special class of public
goods economies defined in the previous section. Since L(e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ EL, the Lindahl
mechanism is well defined. Furthermore, since ui is locally non-satiated on E by assumption, we
know (x, y) is Pareto efficient by the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. Then, the Lindahl
process 〈ML, µL, hL〉 is privacy-preserving and non-wasteful over EL.
Also, was noted above, E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Also by Lemma 4,
µL(E¯cq) and ML are homeomorphic to E¯cq. Thus, by Theorem 1, we have M =F ML =F
R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Q.E.D.
5 The Uniqueness Theorem
In this section we establish that the Lindahl allocation process is the only informationally efficient
decentralized mechanism for public goods economies among smooth mechanisms that achieve
Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations. We first show the following lemmas.
Lemma 5 Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation mechanism on the class of public goods
economies Ecq such that:
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(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) it is individually rational with respect to the fixed share guarantee structure
γi(e; θ).
Then, there is a function φ : µ(Ecq)→ RL+IK++ × Z defined by φ(m) = (p, q, x, y) where (x, y) =
h(m) and (p, q) is an efficiency price system at the allocation (x, y). In particular, (p, qi) is
proportional to Dui(wi + x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) for consumer i = 1, . . . , I, and (p, qˆ) is proportional to DT (yi)
for producer i = I+1,+ . . . , N for each e ∈ Ecq with m ∈ µ(e), where T (yi) = b1i y1i +
∑L
l=2(y
ρl
i +
bli
2 (y
ρl
i )
2) +
∑L
k=1(y
σk
i +
dki
2 (y
σk
i )
2) = 0.
Proof. Let e ∈ Ecq, let m ∈ µ(e), and let (x, y) = h(m). Since (x, y) is Pareto optimal, there
exists an efficiency price system (p, q) ∈ RL+IK++ so that φ(m) = (p, q, x, y) is an equilibrium
relative to the price system (p, q). Also, since (x, y) is individually rational with respect to the
fixed share guarantee structure γi(e; θ) and utility functions ui(x) are Cobb-Douglas, we have
(wi+x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) ∈ RL+K++ by noting that [p·yρj+qˆ ·yσj ] = 0 for all j = I+1, . . . , N and (γi(e; θ)+wi) ∈
RL++ for all i = 1, . . . , I. Also, since y1i = − 1b1i
∑L
l=2(y
ρl
i +
bli
2 (y
ρl
i )
2) +− 1
b1i
∑K
k=1(y
σk
i +
dki
2 (y
σk
i )
2)
is strictly concave, yi is an interior point of Y(ci, di) for all i = I + 1, . . . , N . Therefore, (p, qi)
must be proportional to Dui(wi + x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) for i = 1, . . . , I, and (p, qˆ) must be proportional to
DT (yi) for i = I + 1,+ . . . , N , where Dui and DT denote the partial derivative vectors local
tangent spaces. Let e′ ∈ Ecq be any other environment with m ∈ µ(e′). Since 〈M,µ, h〉 is
privacy-preserving, by Remark 1, we have m ∈ µ(e′i, e−i) for each i = 1, . . . , N . Therefore,
(x, y) ∈ h[µ(e′i, e−i)] for each i = 1, . . . , N , and thus (p, qi) is proportional to Du′i(wi + xρi , xσi )
for i = 1, . . . , I, and (p, qˆ) is proportional to DT ′(yi) for i = I + 1,+ . . . , N . Thus, φ is well
defined. Q.E.D.
Next we want to show that the equilibrium message cannot reveal any more than the allo-
cation (x, y) and the efficiency price vector (p, q). In other words, if the message space M has
minimal dimension and µ is a continuous function, then φ is a one-to-one mapping.
Lemma 6 Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation mechanism on the class of public goods
economies Ecq such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) it is individually rational with respect to a given fixed share guarantee structure
γi(e; θ);
(iv) M is a (L+K − 1)I + (L+K)J dimensional manifold;
(v) µ is a continuous function on Ecq.
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Let e¯ ∈ Ecq and let (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) = φ[µ(e¯)], where φ is defined as Lemma 5. If e∗ is any environment
such that w∗i + x¯
ρ
i > 0, and Du
∗
i (w
∗
i + x¯
ρ
i , x¯
σ
i ) is proportional to (p¯, q¯i) for consumer i = 1, . . . , I,
and DT ∗(y¯i) is proportional to (p¯,
∑I
i=1 q¯i) for producer i = I + 1,+ . . . , N , then µ(e
∗) = µ(e¯).
In particular, φ is a one-to-one function.
Proof. For e¯ ∈ Ecq, define the set E¯cq = {(w, a, b, c, d) ∈ Ecq : wi = w¯i ∀i = 1, . . . , I}. Note
that, by Lemma 1, for each e, e′ ∈ E¯cq, if for some (x, y) ∈ Z, Dui(w¯i+xρi , xσi ) is proportional to
Du′i(w¯i + x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) for consumer i = 1, . . . , I, and DTi(y) is proportional to DT
′(yi) for producer
i = I + 1, . . . , N , then a = a′, b = b′, c = c′, and d = d′. Thus, by Lemma 5, φ · µ is one-to-one
on E¯cq and so µ is one-to-one on E¯cq.
Since E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J , we can consider E¯cq as an open subset
of R(L+K−1)I+(L+K)J . Let N(e¯) be an open neighborhood of e¯ in E¯cq and let m¯ = µ(e¯).
Since M is a (L + K − 1)I + (L + K)J dimensional manifold, M and E¯cd are manifolds of
the same dimension. Also, since µ is a one-to-one function on N(e¯), V (m¯) ≡ µ(N(e¯)) is an
open neighborhood of m¯ and µ is a homeomorphism on N(e¯) to V (m¯) by Exercise 18.10 in
Greenberg (1967, p. 82). Let n = (L + K − 1)I + (L + K)J , and let Hn(M,M − m¯) denote
the n-th singular homology module of M relative to M − m¯, with integral coefficients. Then
Hn(M,M − m¯) is isomorphic to Z (denoted by Hn(M,M − m¯) ∼= Z), the set of integers, and
the homomorphism i∗ : Hn(V (m¯), V (m¯) − m¯) → Hn(M,M − m¯) induced by the inclusion
i : (V (m¯), V (m¯)− m¯)→ (M,M − m¯) is isomorphism (see Greenberg (1967, p. 111)).
Also, by the hypothesis, D lnu∗i (w
∗
i +x¯
ρ
i , x¯
σ
i ) is proportional to ln u¯i(w¯i+x¯
ρ
i , x¯
σ
i ) for consumer
i = 1, . . . , I, and DT ∗(y¯i) is proportional to DT¯ (y¯i) for producer i = I + 1, . . . , N so there is
some λ∗i > 0, one for each i, such that for consumer i = 1, . . . , I
a∗li
w∗li + x¯
ρl
i
= λ∗i
a¯li
w¯li + x¯
ρl
i
, l = 2, . . . , L,
c∗ki = λ
∗
i c¯
k
i ,
and for producer i = I + 1, . . . , N ,
b∗li =
 λ
∗
i b¯
l
i if l = 1
λ∗i (1+b¯
l
iy
ρl
i )−1
yρli
if l = 2, . . . , L
,
d∗ki =
λ∗i (1 + d¯
k
i y
σk
i )− 1
yσki
.
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Define the function G : N(e¯)× [0, 1]→ Ecq by G((w¯, a, b, c, d), t) = (w′, a′, b′, c′, d′), where
w′i = tw
∗
i + (1− t)w¯i,
ali = [ta¯
l
i + (1− t)ali]
w′li + x¯
ρl
i
w¯li + x¯
ρl
i
[tλ∗i + (1− t)] i = 1, . . . , I, l = 2, . . . , L,
cki = [tc¯
k
i + (1− t)cki ][tλ∗i + (1− t)] i = 1, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ,K,
b′i =
 [tb¯
1
i + (1− t)b1i ][tλ∗i + (1− t)] if l = 1
[tλ∗i+(1−t)][1+(tb¯li+(1−t)bli)yρli ]−1
yρli
l = 2, . . . , L
i = I + 1, . . . , N
d′i =
[tλ∗i + (1− t)][1 + (td¯ki + (1− t)dki )yσki ]− 1
yσki
k = 1, . . . ,K. (64)
Then, G(·, 0) is the inclusion map by noting that G((w¯, a, b, c, d), 0) = (w¯, a, b, c, d) for all
(w¯, a, b, c, d) ∈ N(e¯), andG(·, 1) is the constant map onN(e¯) to e∗ by noting thatG((w¯, a, b, c, d), 1) =
(w∗, a∗, b∗, c∗, d∗) for all (w¯, a, b, c, d) ∈ N(e¯). Let t ∈ [0, 1], (w¯, a, b, c, d) ∈ N(e¯) with (w¯, a, b, c, d) 6=
e¯, and (w′, a′, b′, c′, d′) = G(w¯, a, b, c, d, t). Then a
′l
i
w′li +x¯
ρl
i
is proportional to ta¯
l
i+(1−t)ali
w¯li+x¯
ρl
i
for i =
1, . . . , I and l = 2, . . . , L, c′ki is proportional to tc¯
l
i+(1−t)cli for i = 1, . . . , I and k = 1, . . . ,K, b′1i
is proportional to [tb¯1i+(1−t)b1i ], [1+b′li y¯ρli ] is proportional to [1+(tb¯li+(1−t)bki )y¯ρli ] for l = 2, . . . , L
and i = I+1, . . . , N , and [1+d′ki y¯
σk
i ] is proportional to [1+(td¯
k
i +(1− t)dki )y¯σki ] for k = 1, . . . ,K
and i = I+1, . . . , N . Then environment (w¯, ta¯+(1−t)a, tb¯+(1−t)b, tc¯+(1−t)c, td¯+(1−t)d) ∈
E¯cq, so by the argument in the first paragraph, for each t < 1, µ[G(e, t)] = m¯ only if e = e¯.
Now, suppose by way of contradiction that µ(e∗) 6= m¯. Then µ[G(e, t)] 6= m¯ whenever e 6= e¯.
Define G′ : (V (m¯), V (m¯)− m¯)× [0, 1]→ (M,M − m¯) by G′(m, t) = µ(G[µ−1(m), t]). Then G′ is
a homotopy between the inclusion i : (V (m¯), V (m¯)− m¯)→ (M,M − m¯) and the constant map
j : (V (m¯), V (m¯)− m¯) → (m∗,M − m¯), where m∗ = µ(e∗). Hence, i∗ = j∗ and consequently i∗
is the zero homomorphism, which contradicts the fact that i∗ is isomorphic to Z. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 (The Uniqueness Theorem) Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation mechanism
on the class of public goods economies Ecq such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) it is individually rational with respect to the fixed share guarantee structure
γi(e; θ);
(iv) M is a (L+K − 1)I + (L+K)J dimensional manifold;
(v) µ is a continuous function on Ecq.
Then, there is a homeomorphism φ on µ(Ecq) to ML such that
(a) µL = φ · µ;
(b) hL · φ = h.
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The conclusion of the theorem is summarized in the following commutative homeomorhpism
diagram:
Ecq
µL−→ MLyµ φ ↗↙φ−1 yhL
µ(Ecq) h−→ Z
Proof. Let φ : M → RL+IK++ × Z be the function defined as Lemma 5. We first show that
µL = φ · µ. Suppose by way of contradiction that µL(e) 6= φ[µ(e)] for some e ∈ Ecq. Let
(p, q, x, y) = φ[µ(e)]. Then (x, y) is not a θ-Lindahl equilibrium allocation, i.e., (x, y) 6∈ Lθ(e).
Thus, for some i, we have p·xρi+qi ·xσi <
∑I+I
j=I+1 θij [p·yρj+qˆ·yσj ]. Let w∗i = (1/t)(wi+xρi )−xρi , let
e∗i = (w
∗
i , ai, bi, ci, di), let e
∗ = (e∗i , e−i), and let g(t) = ui[(1− t)(wi+xρi )+ t(wi+γi(e∗; θ)), xσi ]−
ui(wi + x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) where 0 < t < 1. Then, g(t)→ 0 as t→ 0, and dg/dt = Dρui[(1− t)(wi + xρi ) +
t(wi + γi(e∗; θ)), xσi ](γi(e
∗; θ) − xρi ) → Dρui[wi + xρi , xσi ]((wi + xρi )
∑I+I
j=I+1 θij [p·yρj+qˆ·yσj ]
p·(wi+xρi )
− xρi ) =
λp · [(wi+xρi )
∑I+I
j=I+1 θij [p·yρj+qˆ·yσj ]
p·(wi+xρi )
−xρi ] = λ(
∑I+I
j=I+1 θij [p · yρj + qˆ · yσj ]− p ·xρi ) > 0 for some λ > 0
as t → 0 by noting that Dρui[wi + xρi , xσi ] is proportional to p and p · xρi 5 p · xρi + qi · xσi <∑I+I
j=I+1 θij [p · yj + qˆ · yσj ]. Here Dρui(·) is the vector of partial derivatives with respect to xρi .
Thus we have g(t) = ui[(1 − t)(wi + xρi ) + t(wi + γi(e∗; θ)), xσi )] − ui(wi + xρi , xσi ) > 0, i.e.,
ui[(1 − t)(wi + xρi , xσi ) + t(wi + γi(e∗; θ)), xσi ] > ui(wi + xρi , xσi ) when t is a sufficiently small
positive number by noting that g(·) is continuous and g(t) → 0 as t → 0. Then, multiplying
1/t on the both sides of ui[(1− t)(wi + xρi , xσi ) + t(wi + γi(e∗; θ))] > ui(wi + xρi , xσi ) and by the
homogeneity of preferences represented by ui(·), we have ui((1/t)(wi + xρi ), xσi ) < ui((1/t)(wi +
xρi ) − xρi + γi(e∗; θ), xσi ) when t is a sufficiently small positive number. Thus, since 〈M,µ, h〉 is
individually rational with respect to the fixed share guarantee structure γi(e∗; θ), we must have
µ(e∗) 6= µ(e) otherwise we have ui(w∗i + xρi , xσi ) = ui((1/t)(wi + xρi ), xσi ) < ui((1/t)(wi + xρi ) −
xρi +γi(e
∗; θ), xσi ) = ui(w
∗
i +γi(e
∗; θ), xσi ) which contradicts the hypothesis that (x, y) = h[µ(e
∗)]
is individually rational with respect to the fixed share guarantee structure γi(e∗; θ). However,
(x, y) is Pareto optimal for e∗, and Dui(w∗i + x
ρ
i , x
σ
i ) is proportional to (p, qi), Lemma 6 implies
that µ(e∗) = µ(e), a contradiction. So we must have µL = φ · µ. Furthermore, since hL is the
projection (p, q, x, y)→ (x, y), it follows that hL · φ = h.
Now we show that φ is a homeomorphism on µ(Ecq) to ML. By Lemma 6, φ is a one-to-one
mapping. Also, since hL · φ = h, the range of φ is ML. So it only remains to show that φ and
φ−1 are continuous. To show that φ−1 is continuous, let {m(k)} be a sequence in ML, which
converges to some m ∈ ML with m(k) = µ(e(k)) for all k and m ∈ µ(e). Since φ−1 · µL = µ,
φ−1(m(k)) = µ(e(k)) for all k and φ−1(m) = µ(e). Since µ is continuous, µ(e(k)) converges
to µ(e), so φ−1 is continuous. Since ML and M are manifolds of the same dimension, φ−1 is a
homeomorphism on ML to φ−1(ML) = µ(Ecq) by Exercise 18.10 in Greenberg (1967. p. 82).
Q.E.D.
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Remark 3 The Uniqueness Theorem obtained above is based on the class of Cobb-Douglas–
Quadratic production economies. As in Jordan (1982), a similar example may be constructed
to show that, for the Uniqueness Theorem, it is necessary to require the relation Cobb-Douglas–
Quadratic environments and equilibrium messages be single-valued and continuous. The single-
valuedness requirement cannot be extended much beyond the Cobb-Douglas–Quadratic class
without conflicting with the multiplicity of Lindahl equilibrium. Nevertheless, similar to Jordan
(1982), we can extend the above Uniqueness Theorem to more general classes of economic
environments if we impose the additional regularity assumptions that the message space is
connected and that the set of messages associated with Cobb-Douglas–Quadratic environments
is a closed subset of the message space.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, it has been shown that the minimal dimension of message space for privacy preserv-
ing and non-wasteful resource allocation processes on the neoclassical public goods economies
with any number of producers and commodities is the dimension of the Lindahl message space
that equals (L+K−1)I+(L+K)J , and thus the Lindahl mechanism is informationally the most
efficient decentralized mechanism. Furthermore, it is shown that the Lindahl mechanism is the
unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient and
individually allocations over the class of the public goods economies with Cobb-Douglas utility
functions and Quadratic production functions. This unique informational efficiency result on
the Lindahl mechanism for public goods economies is a kind of impossibility theorem: it implies
that there exists no other privacy preserving, individually rational, and non-wasteful resource
mechanism that uses a message space whose informational size is smaller than, or the same as,
that of the Lindahl message space.
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